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ESSAY
The Political Price of the Independent
Counsel Law
By JOSHUA M. PERTrULA*
I. Introduction
In August 1994, pursuant to Title VI of the Ethics in Government
Act,1 a Special Division of the Judiciary appointed Kenneth Starr as "inde-
pendent counsel" in Clinton's financial dealings involving the Whitewater
Development Company.2 Starr replaced Special Prosecutor Robert Fiske
Jr., who had been appointed by Attorney General Janet Reno eight months
earlier.3 At the request of President Clinton, Reno appointed Fiske to be-
gin investigating Whitewater while Congress continued to debate whether
to reenact Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act, commonly known as
the independent counsel law.4
In June 1994, President Clinton reenacted the law in its current form
by signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act.5 According to
the rationale behind the Act, the appointment of an independent counsel by
a Special Division of federal judges removes any institutional conflict of
interest that is created when a prosecutor investigating the executive
branch is appointed by the executive branch.6 Although this institutional
conflict was present when Attorney General Reno appointed Fiske to in-
* J.D., 1998, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1993).
2. See Kenneth Jost, Independent Counsels, CQ REsEARcHER, Feb. 21, 1997, at 155.
3. See id. at 153.
4. See Jane Mayer, How Independent is the Counsel?, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 1996 at
58.
5. Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599
(1993)).
6. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at54 (1977).
[2571
vestigate President Clinton, only a small number of congressional Republi-
cans voiced unhappiness with his investigation. 7 Further, Congress spe-
cifically included a provision in the 1994 reauthorization of the Act which
allowed Fiske to automatically take over as independent counsel.8 Not-
withstanding this provision, the Special Division decided that the appear-
ance of a conflict of interest was too great to allow Fiske to continue and
subsequently replaced him with Kenneth Starr.9
The Special Division's appointment of Starr, however, did not elimi-
nate concerns of conflicting interests. Starr and the events surrounding his
appointment raised a new set of political and financial conflicts of interest.
For example, The Washington Post reported that prior to Starr's appoint-
ment, David Sentelle, the presiding judge of the Special Division, was seen
lunching with North Carolina Senators Jesse Helms and Lauch Faircloth,
two of Fiske's most vehement critics. 10 In addition, The New Yorker
pointed out that Starr publicly opposed President Clinton's bid for limited
immunity in the Paula Jones case.11 These alleged political conflicts of
interest prompted The New York Times to call for Starr's resignation.
12
Starr stayed on, however, and continues to devote his time to organi-
zations that cause his impartiality to be questioned. In 1995, Starr was re-
tained by the Bradley Foundation, a conservative lobbying group, to work
on a school voucher case in Wisconsin.13 Starr's critics argue that it was
inappropriate for him, as independent counsel investigating the President,
to lobby publicly for an issue being debated in the presidential campaign.
14
In addition, at the time of his appointment, Starr represented International
Paper Company, which had previously sold land to the Whitewater Devel-
opment Company. '5 Even though the transaction was unrelated to the in-
vestigation, there was speculation that Starr purposely withheld his in-
volvement with the company.' 6 Eventually, Starr was forced to withdraw
from any further dealings with International Paper Company.'7
Unlike other federal employees, Starr has financially prospered while
working for the government. As independent counsel, Starr receives a per
7. See Mayer, supra note 4, at 59.
8. See id.
9. See id
10. See id
11. Seeid. at62.
12. See Jost, supra note 2, at 153.
13. See Mayer, supra note 4, at 59.
14. See Jost, supra note 2, at 153.
15. See Mayer, supra note 4, at 59.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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diem rate equivalent to an annual compensation of $115,700.18 This
amount is in addition to the more than $1 million a year he receives from
Kirkland & Ellis, the law firm where he continues to pursue his private
practice.19 Moreover, the Kirkland & Ellis compensation includes pay-
ments from companies, like Brown & Williamson and Phillip Morris, that
have a financial stake in the outcome of Starr's investigation.2 Accord-
ingly, his annual income of $1.1 million, a compensation unprecedented in
amount and source for a federal prosecutor, has led to calls for Starr's res-
ignation.2
Kenneth Starr's political and financial conflicts of interest are the re-
sult of the flaws that exist in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. The
Act creates a federal prosecutor, appointed by the judiciary, to ensure that
investigations of "principal" executive officers are handled in an impartial
manner.22 At the inception of the Act, two separate but related purposes
were behind the independent counsel arrangement. First, a federal prose-
cutor not accountable to the executive branch would create an impartial
check against overreaching executive power.23 Second, an impartial check
against overreaching executive power would help restore public confi-
dence in the integrity of the executive branch.24 In practice, however, the
Act has done more harm than it has accomplished good. Independent
counsels have become partisan tools that limit executive power. Further,
the partisanship of the independent counsels have, in turn, lowered public
confidence in the entire political process. Accordingly, the Act is in need
of revision.
This essay focuses on three areas that, if reformed, will remedy the
inherent flaws in the current independent counsel arrangement. First, the
independent counsel law's scope is injuriously broad. Second, the Act's
current procedures for initiating an investigation are too easily triggered.
Third, and most important, the arrangement fails to contain a provision that
controls the amount or source of money an independent counsel can re-
ceive. If correctly reformed, these three areas will protect against the mis-
use of executive power and help restore public confidence in the integrity
18. See Jost, supra note 2, at 152 n*.
19. See Walter Pincus & George Lardner, Jr., Ken Starr's Paycheck Gets Fatter: The Inde-
pendent Counsel Takes in a Cool Million-Plus from his Private Law Firm, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 22, 1997 (National Weekly Edition), at 11.
20. See Mayer, supra note 4, at 62.
21. See Stephen Labaton, Whitewater Counsel Defends Continuing His Private Practice,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1996, at A19.
22. See id.
23. See Terry Eastland, The Independent Counsel Regime, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer
1990, at 69.
24. See id. at 70.
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of the political system, the two goals the Act was originally intended to
achieve.
H. Background
A. Political Climate Leading to the Creation of the Independent Counsel
Law
At the time Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was
being considered by Congress, its supporters contended that the law was
essential to correct a flaw in the political system.2 Specifically, supporters
contended that the law was necessary to combat the conflict of interest that
existed when an executive officer, namely a Department of Justice prose-
cutor, was in charge of investigating a superior in the executive branch,
namely the President of the United States. Critics of the law, on the other
hand, opined that this conflict of interest was not a flaw in the political
system but, rather, was "like those [conflicts] that arise when judges decide
disputes involving judges' pay or when Congress exempts itself from laws
that it makes," as part of the constitutional balancing of power.27 In either
case, a brief review of the history that preceded Title VI's enactment is
necessary to understand its passage.
During the Nixon Administration, Attorney General Elliot Richardson
appointed Archibald Cox, as a "special prosecutor" of the Department of
Justice, to investigate the Watergate burglary.28 While investigating the
burglary, Cox learned of, and subsequently subpoenaed, audio tapes that
President Nixon had secretly recorded.29 Fearing the damage he would in-
cur from the release of the tapes, Nixon offered Cox a compromise to ful
disclosure.30 Contingent on Cox's commitment not to seek any further
tapes, Nixon offered to turn over a transcript of the recordings from which
national security matters would be redacted.31 Cox rejected Nixon's com-
promise.32 In an attempt to avoid disclosure, Nixon ordered Richardson to
fire Cox. 33 Both Richardson and his Deputy Attorney General William D.
Ruckelshaus chose to resign rather than fire Cox.3 4 At Nixon's request,
25. See id. at 69.
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
27. Eastland, supra note 23, at 69.
28. See Robert Bork, Against the Independent Counsel, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 22.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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Solicitor General Robert Bork, the third and last Department of Justice
employee in the line of succession, terminated Cox.3 5 These resignations
and firings have come to be referred to as 'The Saturday Night Massacre"
and are considered the catalyst for the independent counsel law.36
Title VI, therefore, was born out of public discontent. The public
feared that misconduct like President Nixon's might go unpunished if a
presidential appointee was in charge of investigating the President. Under
the then existing system, supporters argued, Department of Justice prose-
cutors were too close to "principal" executive officers to conduct impartial
investigations.37 Under Title VI, however, a federal prosecutor appointed
by the judiciary could investigate the chief executive officer without any
fear of retaliation and, in turn, help restore public confidence in the integ-
rity of the executive in the process.
38
Critics of the independent counsel agreement opined that a change in
the system was unnecessary. They argued that our constitutional system
gives the government adequate safeguards to protect against what historian
Arthur Schlesinger termed "imperial" executive power.39 In making their
argument, opponents of the law pointed to three safeguards in the original
system that protect against the misuse of executive power: the power of
Congress to impeach, the executive branch's historical use of "outside" or
"special" prosecutors, and practical institutional limitations. 40
First, Congress alone has the power to commence impeachment pro-
ceedings against an executive officer.41 Therefore, even without the inde-
pendent counsel law, Congress has the power to remove a President, or any
executive officer, convicted of "[t]reason, [b]ribery, or other high [c]rimes
and [m]isdemeanors." 42 The Constitution requires a majority vote in the
House of Representatives to begin the impeachment process.43 Once the
House decides to begin the impeachment process, the Senate is responsible
for conducting a trial.44 In practice, however, no executive officer has ever
been successfully impeached, and, only two presidents, Andrew Johnson
and Richard Nixon, have been the subject of serious impeachment ef-
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Eastland, supra note 23, at 69.
38. See id.
39. See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
40. See infra notes 41-65 and accompanying notes.
41. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 39, at 10.
42. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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forts.4,5 Therefore, except for the most extreme cases, impeachment is not
a realistic option for controlling misuse of executive power.
Second, opponents of the independent counsel law argued that the
President or the Attorney General already had the ability to appoint a
prosecutor to investigate any executive official accused of criminal mis-
conduct.46 Historically, the President has used "outside" or "special"
prosecutors to investigate executive officers with minimal conflicts of in-
terest.47 Unlike the current independent counsel, however, the federal
prosecutors of the past were appointed and controlled by the executive.48
For instance, in 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant appointed John B.
Henderson as special counsel to investigate and prosecute the President's
personal secretary in the St. Louis Whiskey Ring case.4 9 In 1902, Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt appointed Francis J. Heney to prosecute the
President's former Commissioner of the General Land Office for land
fraud.50 Further, in 1924, President Calvin Coolidge appointed a special
prosecutor to investigate criminal misconduct in the Teapot Dome scan-
dal.51  And, most recently, President Nixon's Attorney General Elliot
Richardson appointed outside prosecutor Archibald Cox to investigate the
Watergate burglary.52 Opponents of the law argued that the success of
these examples proved that an outside or special prosecutor appointed by
the executive branch could adequately check the misuse of executive
power by investigating and prosecuting criminal misconduct, all without
changing the existing system.
Lastly, a number of institutional limitations exist that safeguard
against imperial executive power. Theodore Sorensen, in his book Watch-
men in the Night: Presidential Accountability after Watergate,3 writes
that there are four institutional limitations that prohibit the President from
wielding imperial executive power: the executive branch's bureaucracy,
the press, Congress, and the judiciary.,5 4 First, Sorensen contends that the
bureaucracy of the executive branch can be a powerful check against ex-
45. See TERRY EASTLAND, ETmHCS, PoLmCS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL:
EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989 8 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest
ed., 1989).
46. See id.
47. See iai
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Theodore Sorensen, WATCHMEN IN THE NIGHT: PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABL1TY
AFrER WATERGATE (1975).
54. See id. at 34.
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ecutive power. 55 For instance, agency heads, once in office, are not al-
ways supportive of the president. Rather, these political appointees begin
to rely on "Congress for their funds, career personnel for advice and ideas,
and particular constituent groups for support."56 As an example of this
phenomenon, Sorensen points to the Internal Revenue Service's insistence
on rejecting President Nixon's request to audit a list of his enemies.5 7 Sec-
ond, Sorensen contends that aggressive reporting and investigative jour-
nalism safeguard against imperial executive power.5 8 Third, Sorensen dis-
agrees with Representative Don Edwards' analysis of the power of
Congress to force President Nixon to turn over evidence ("He's got the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and all we've got is the [House Sergeant-at-
Arms]."). 59  In'stead, Sorensen points out that the power of Congress to
"establish new agencies and abolish old ones, withhold confirmation of
presidential appointees, withhold funds, limit the number and salary of his
White House Aides, and block his use of the armed forces, can be a power-
ful check on executive power." 6  Finally, Sorensen contends that the
courts are an important check on executive power.61  Historically, the
courts have, among other things, limited the president's power to seize in-
dustrial plants,62 regulate commerce in national emergencies, 63 enjoin
newspaper publication of "leaked" government, documents, 64 and most re-
cently, required the President to defend against civil suits while in office. 65
The combination of these four institutional safeguards, therefore, help to
ensure that the executive branch does not misuse its power.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Watergate, no amount of safeguards
could curtail congressional action. In 1978, President Carter signed Title
66VI of the Ethics in Government Act into law. A provision of the law,
known as the sunset provision, forces Congress to reevaluate the law every
5 years.67 In 1982, the statute was reenacted with minor amendments.6 8 In
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 37.
58. See id. at 40. Recently, many politicians have demanded that the press allow elected of-
ficials a certain amount of privacy. In response to these demands, Sorensen astutely warns that
"[i]rresponsiblejournalists can hurt; but irresponsible President's can destroy." Id.
59. See id.
60. Md at 43-44.
61. See id. at47-52.
62. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
63. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
64. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (1997).
66. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 49,591-599 (1993).
67. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 599.
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1987, the law was reenacted, but in 1992, Congress allowed it to lapse.69
Two years later, following the public outrage over President Bush's par-
dons of Iran-Contra convicts and growing distrust with President Clinton's
Whitewater dealings, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, The
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994.70 Accordingly, the in-
dependent counsel law will be reevaluated in 1999.71
B. Procedural Requirements of the Independent Counsel Law
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as currently amended, sets
forth the procedure for appointing an independent counsel.7 2 The Act was
originally intended to allow an impartial prosecutor to investigate certain
high ranking government officials accused of violating federal criminal
laws.73 In order to achieve this impartiality, Congress vested power to ap-
point an independent counsel in the judiciary, thereby significantly limiting
the executive branch's role in choosing and overseeing an executive em-
ployee, a federal prosecutor.74
In most cases, Congress commences an independent counsel investiga-
tion by forwarding to the Attorney General information which alleges a vio-
lation of a federal criminal law by a certain executive official.75 Once the
Department of Justice receives this initial request for an independent coun-
sel, the Attorney General must decide whether the information is "sufficient
to constitute grounds to investigate.7 6 If the Attorney General finds that the
information fails to satisfy the initial standard, then a report must be filed ex-
plaining the reason a preliminary investigation is not warranted. 77 If, how-
ever, the Attorney General finds that the information satisfies this initial
standard, then a preliminary investigation must be initiated.
78
Upon completing a preliminary investigation, or 90 days after one has
been initiated, the Attorney General must report to the Special Division of
the courts,79 which is composed of three federal Judges appointed by the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court for 2 year terms and is in
68. See id. (The most important change at that time was in the name of the prosecutor, from
"special prosecutor" to "independent counser').
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id
72. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.
73. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 49.
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 592.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
(Vol. 25:255
W8C
charge of appointing an impartial prosecutor.80 If the Attorney General's
report concludes that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation or prosecution is warranted," then the Special Division will
select an independent counsel.81 At the time of selection, the Department
of Justice must suspend all other investigations and proceedings regarding
the matter.
8 2
Once appointed, the Act grants the prosecutor "full power and inde-
pendent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions
and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any
other officer or employee of the Department of Justice .... ,,83 In sum-
mary, the independent counsel's powers include "initiating and conducting
prosecutions", 84 conducting grand jury proceedings,85 participating in civil
86
and criminal court proceedings, and "appealing any decision in which [he
or she] participates in an official capacity." 87 The Act further states that an
independent counsel shall, where possible, "comply with the written or
other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforce-
ment of the criminal laws. 88
The length of an independent counsel's tenure is determined by any of
the three possible events: the completion of any investigation or prosecu-
tion, impeachment and conviction,9 or termination by the Attorney Gen-
eral "for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other
condition that substantially impairs the performance of [the] independent
counsel's duties." 91 If the Attorney General removes the independent coun-
sel, he or she is required to submit a report to the Special Division and
Congress stating the grounds for termination.92
80. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 597(a).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(9).
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1).
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(2).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(3).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1). Before the completion of any investigation or prosecution,
or every 6 months, the independent counsel is obligated to file a report describing the completed
work, including the disposition of all cases. See id
90. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (Impeachment Clause).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(A).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2).
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C. Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Law
Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was challenged on
constitutional grounds ten years after its inception in Morrison v. Olsen.
93
In Morrison, the Court held that the Act, taken as a whole, does not violate
the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution,94 or separation
of powers principles.95 In upholding the constitutionality of the independ-
ent counsel statute, the Morrison Court found that an independent counsel
is an "inferior" executive officer and Congress has the power to appoint
"inferior" executive officers. 96 The Court reasoned that because an inde-
pendent counsel is subject to removal by the Attorney General, empowered
to perform limited duties, and limited in tenure and jurisdiction, an inde-
pendent counsel is an "inferior" executive officer.97 Since Congress has
the ability to vest power to appoint "inferior" executive officers in the ju-
diciary under the current interpretation of the Appointments Clause, the
Morrison Court held that Congress had the constitutional power to request
that the judiciary, and not the executive, appoint an independent counsel. 98
In addition, the Morrison Court found that the Act did not impermis-
sibly interfere with the President's exercise of his constitutionally ap-
pointed functions.99 The Court held that the independent counsel removal
restrictions left the Executive Branch "sufficient control over the [prose-
cutor] to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally
assigned duties."1°° Therefore, the Morrison decision stands for the propo-
sition that Congress has the power to limit the President's removal power
of purely executive officers, as long as the appointee is an "inferior" ex-
ecutive officer and the removal restrictions are not of such nature that they
impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty. °1
In the aftermath of the Morrison decision, opponents of the independ-
ent counsel law argue that the Court incorrectly characterized an independ-
ent counsel as an "inferior" executive officer.1 2 The Court reasoned that
to determine if an executive officer is "inferior" or "principal," it must de-
93. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause).
95. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-97. Separation of Powers principles are derived from the
boundaries that exist between the separate powers that the Constitution gives to each branch of
government.
96. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673, 691.
97. See id. at 671-73.
98. See id. at 674-75, 677.
99. See id. at 696.
100. See id. at 696.
101. See id.
102. See supra note 55-56 and accompanying text.
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cide whether he or she is accountable to the executive. 103 Applying this
reasoning, the Morrison Court found that an independent counsel is subor-
dinate to high executive officials because of the removal provisions, there-
fore, an independent counsel must be "inferior."' 4 In practice, however,
the high executive removal standard has created a federal prosecutor an-
swerable to no one.'05
Further, opponents of the law contend that even if inferior, the Presi-
dent must be able to remove a purely executive officer, unencumbered by
any legislative restrictions, because the executive branch has the sole
power of carrying out the laws. This reasoning follows the "formal" or
"positivist" approach to the separation of powers doctrine, emphasizing the
separateness of the branches.'06 Positivists believe that the Supreme
Court's Morrison decision was incorrect and that the Court should have
followed its previous reasoning in Bowsher v. Synar'07 and INS v.
Chadha.108 In both Bowsher and Chadha, the Court was sympathetic to the
argument that Congress was aggrandizing its power at the expense of the
executive.1' 9 For instance, in Chadha, the Court held that the judicial
branch's role cannot be abridged by action of another branch, and con-
versely, functions that are the appropriate jobs of the other branch's cannot
be given instead to the judicial branch." 0 In the case of the independent
counsel statute, opponents argue that the law violates separation of powers
principles because Congress is interfering with the president's untram-
meled right to enforce the laws of the United States."' Justice Scalia, the
lone dissenter in Morrison, reasoned that separation of power principles
required the President to maintain complete control over the investigation
and prosecution of violations of the law and that the independent counsel
law allowed Congress to unconstitutionally distribute that power to the ju-
diciary. 12 Accordingly, Morrison critics contend that the independent
counsel arrangement unconstitutionally places executive power in the
hands of the judiciary.
On the other hand, supporters of the independent counsel believe that
the Court was correct in finding that an independent counsel is an "infe-
103. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679-82.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Katy J. Harringer, Separation of Powers and the Politics of Independent Counsels,
POL SCi. Q., Summer 1994, at 262.
107. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
108. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
109. See Harringer, supra note 106, at 163.
110. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 965-66.
111. See Harringer, supra note 106, at 262.
112. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 108-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rior" executive officer. Supporters believe that the independent counsel's
limited tenure and lack of authority to formulate policy is decisive.
113
Following this reasoning, appointment of an "inferior" executive officer by
the judiciary would not violate the Appointments Clause.
In addition, proponents of the law agree with the Morrison Court's
findings that the independent counsel law does not violate separation of
powers principles. This reasoning follows the "functional" or "dialectical"
approach to the separation of powers doctrine, allowing adaptation and
emphasizing the "ambiguities of the distribution of powers in the sys-
tem."114 Functional scholars opine that a law does not violate separation of
powers principles if it allows the executive branch to retain a certain level
of power.115 Accordingly, functionalists point to the attorney general's
removal power, "for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or
any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of [his or
her] duties," to support their contention that the statute does not unconsti-
tutionally impede the exercise of executive power.
116
HI. Discussion
Since the inception of the independent counsel law in 1978, there
have been approximately nineteen independent counsel investigations
which have cost a total of $120 million.1 7 Most of these investigations
have been expensive, time consuming and have resulted in no charges be-
ing filed. To date, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has spent 3/2 years
and well over $35 million on the Whitewater investigation. 18 Lawrence
Walsh spent 7 years investigating the Iran-Contra scandal. 1 9 Independent
counsel Michael Zeldin, after 3 years and $2.8 million, concluded that the
allegations that President George Bush's White House aides illegally
searched Bill Clinton's passport files had no merit.120 These statistics are
especially amazing when compared to the previous two centuries. Be-
tween 1776-1978 only five "outside" or "special" prosecutors were ap-
pointed to investigate executive misconduct.
121
The above statistics beg the question of whether modem day politi-
cians are committing more acts of criminal misconduct than at any other
113. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
114. Harringer, supra note 106, at 262.
115. See id.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
117. See Jost supra note 2, at 157.
118. See id
119. See id. at 157.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 154.
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time in our country's history. Even though the answer to this question is
most likely "no," the question is asked anew with each independent coun-
sel appointment. In turn, public confidence in the integrity of executive
officials continues to decline. Therefore, the law that was created to check
executive power and restore public confidence in the integrity of executive
officials has gone too far. In the rush for a solution, the drafters failed to
foresee the negative repercussions of the Act, an "unprecedented extension
of congressional power [while] unjustifiably weaken[ing] the executive
branch.'2 Accordingly, some commentators believe that Congress should
allow the law to lapse when it comes up for reenactment in 1999. A less
extreme solution, however, should not be overlooked. Instead of scrapping
the law, several simple amendments could help the independent counsel
law fulfill its original purpose. By adjusting the scope, initiation proce-
dures, and compensation provisions, the current adverse effects could be
eliminated.
A. Scope
Recently, the most serious attempt to restructure the independent
counsel arrangement has focused on its broad scope with regard to targets,
crimes, and jurisdiction. Unlike the normal prosecutorial system where the
prosecutor begins with the crime and then looks for the criminal,
"I[ndependent] C[ounsel]s start with the names of officials who have come
under suspicion and then are asked to search the law books for a suitable
'crime.''123 The independent counsel prosecutorial system requires that an
independent counsel be appointed when allegations of misconduct are
made against the President or Vice President; Cabinet officers; top White
House aides and officials in the Justice Department, Central Intelligence
Agency, and Internal Revenue Service; and officers of the President's
campaign committee. 24 In addition, "[t]he law gives independent counsels
jurisdiction over all but the most minor federal crimes."1 5 Finally, the law
allows independent counsels to easily expand their investigations beyond
the initial accusations. 126 Accordingly, independent counsel investigations
authorized by the current Act cover too many executive officials, involve
too many federal crimes and are too easily expanded into unforeseen areas.
122. Easftland, supra note 23, at 68.
123. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Good Idea Gone Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 16, 1996, at 80.
124. See Jost, supra note 2, at 151.
125. Id.
126. See id.
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1. Executive Officials Covered by the Independent Counsel Law
Critics of the Act contend that too many executive officers are cov-
ered by the law.127 The current independent counsel law is applicable if
there is information that any of the 120 executive officials referenced in
the statute committed an act of criminal misconduct. 12 In order to under-
stand the need to limit the number of executive officers covered by the
law, one must look no further than the original purpose of the independent
counsel arrangement. The Act was originally created to avoid situations
where an executive prosecutor was investigating executive officers who
controlled the prosecutor's job security. 129 In particular, Congress believed
that a Department of Justice prosecutor was too close to the Attorney Gen-
eral and President to be an impartial investigator.130 Failing to take into
account this purpose, however, the drafters of the independent counsel ar-
rangement included executive officials who had no relationship to Depart-
ment of Justice prosecutors. In practice, such an over-extensive approach
has limited the Act's benefits and led to serious adverse effects. In re-
sponse to this problem, former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox has suggested that the independent counsel law be limited to the
President, Vice President, key Cabinet officers and high ranking White
House staff.131 Cox argues that beyond the suggested scope, "the opportu-
nities for politically motivated abuse of the law increase, while.., the
credibility of the investigation ... diminishes."'132 Although Cox's rea-
soning is accurate, the law could be effectively narrowed even more than
he suggests. Strictly adhering to the reasoning behind the law, only those
executive officers who have some employment control over the Depart-
ment of Justice prosecutor need be covered by the law. Thus, Congress
could avoid the current problems and refocus on the Act's original intent
by revising the independent counsel law such that its use is limited to the
President, Vice President, and key White House and Department of Justice
staff, all of whom have significant control over the prosecutor's job.
2. Federal Crimes
In addition to criticizing the expansive scope, opponents of the inde-
pendent counsel statute argue that it covers too many crimes. The inde-
pendent counsel statute covers any violations of federal criminal law other
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id
130. See id.
131. See Archibald Cox, Curbing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A37.
132. Id.
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than petty offenses.1 33 Once again, Congress should look to the evil that
the independent counsel law was created to combat. After The Saturday
Night Massacre, legislators were interested in creating an impartial prose-
cutor who would safeguard against imperial executive power.1 34 In their
effort, drafters of the independent counsel statute created a law that in-
cluded far more crimes than were necessary to effect the desired goal. In
addition to serious federal violations, the independent counsel law covers
minor misconduct that could not be considered a misuse of executive
power.135 Further, the independent counsel arrangement covers miscon-
duct that occurs before the executive official entered office-once again,
conduct that has nothing to do with misuse of executive power. 136 In in-
stances where the law is applied based on minor crimes or prior miscon-
duct, the negative effects of the law will likely far outweigh the benefits.
Accordingly, Congress should revise the statute to only cover crimes that
can be considered misuses of state power, abuse of power, or improper in-
fluencing, committed while in office, as those are the types of conduct for
which the Act was originally designed to prevent.
3. Easily Expanded Jurisdiction
Critics of the independent counsel law further argue that its jurisdic-
tion is too easily expanded. Currently, the independent counsel arrange-
ment allows the prosecutor to follow an investigation for as long, and as
far, as it is deemed necessary by the independent counsel. 137 "How fright-
ening it must be," Justice Scalia wrote in his Morrison dissent, "to have
your own independent counsel and staff appointed, with nothing else to do
but investigate you until investigation is no longer worthwhile."'138 The
current Whitewater investigation is a prime example of Scalia's nightmare.
Since the initial allegations, Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction has been ex-
panded to cover three completely unrelated issues: whether former White
House aides lied to federal investigators or Congress in connection with
the White House travel office, whether White House Aides illegally
searched FBI files, and whether President Clinton obstructed justice or
committed perjury in regards to his relationship with White House intern
Monica Lewinsky. t39 Accordingly, Congress should limit an independent
133. See Jost, supra note 2, at 151.
134. See Bork, supra note 28, at 21.
135. Id.
136. See Jost, supra note 2, at 149.
137. See Judy Bachrach, They Who Serve and Suffer, VANrrY FAIR, Dec. 1996, at 148.
138. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. See Jeffrey Rosen, Kenneth Starr, Trapped, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997 (Magazine), at
42.
Winter 1998]
prosecutor's jurisdiction in order to avoid the nightmare foreseen by Jus-
tice Scalia. Critics have suggested that future investigations should be
limited to the initial allegations and charges directly related to them. 4° In
fact, Representatives Jay Dickey and John Conyers Jr. adopted this ap-
proach in recent legislation, but so far Congress has refused to consider
it.141 Nonetheless, the Dickey-Conyers approach is a step toward resolving
the problem.
In order to stop independent counsels from prolonging investigations
and comprehensively addressing the problem, Congress should go one step
further and set limits on the length of any investigation. Congress could
reasonably limit the independent counsel by amending the law such that
charges relating to the initial allegations or related misconduct would have
to be brought within one year from the date the investigation is initiated.
This would provide ample time for an investigation, and still provide pro-
tection against abuse.
B. Initiation Procedures
The independent counsel law's broad scope is only partly responsible
for the law's adverse effects. A more serious problem is posed by the ease
with which an investigation can be initiated. Because the benefits of al-
lowing easy initiation procedures are outweighed by the risks of encour-
aging opposing politicians to dig up or plant stories, the independent coun-
sel initiation procedures are in need of revision. There are two possible
solutions to this problem: legislative restraint and legislative revision.
1. Legislative Restraint
Critics of the independent counsel law contend that legislative re-
straint is not a viable option, an opinion amply supported by the events that
have transpired during the current Clinton Administration. In the past four
years, five new independent counsel investigations have been initiated. 142
The reason for the popularity of the law is simple: the independent coun-
sel law has become the most recent "weapon in the ethics wars constantly
fought by the parties."' 43 Using the independent counsel law, it is easier to
discredit the opposing party's character than it is to debate them on the is-
sues. 144 Further, once independent counsels are requested, whether based
on frivolous or meritorious claims, the party in control of the executive
140. See Jost supra note 2, at 151.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 155.
143. Id. at 151.
144. See Gloria Borger, It's the Law, Not the Lawyers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar.
27, 1995, at 33.
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branch suffers a loss in credibility. Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor of U.S.
News & World Report, articulated this problem when he wrote, "[t]he real
crime today is too often that of being unpopular with the predominant per-
sonalities in Congress or being caught in a political tug of war between
legislative and executive branches controlled by different parties." 145 Con-
sidering the lack of adverse political consequences for requesting an inde-
pendent counsel-and many for the targeted individual-it is doubtful that
any legislator will weigh the costs and decide to refrain from making a
frivolous request. Therefore, legislative restraint is not likely to be a vi-
able option.
2. Legislative Revision
Legislative revision is a far more promising means to control the ease
with which an investigation is initiated. Under the current independent
counsel scheme, the Attorney General has limited discretion to refuse to
apply for an independent counsel. 14 According to the law, the Attorney
General must conduct a preliminary investigation if allegations "[are] suf-
ficient to constitute grounds to investigate."' 47 In practice, however, the
independent counsel arrangement limits the Attorney General's discretion
even more than the standard suggests. Instead of making findings and
drawing conclusions with the benefit of testimony or documents obtained
through subpoenas, the Attorney General must do so through non-
compulsory voluntary investigations. 148 In practice, such limitations mean
"no credible preliminary investigation is possible, and referral to a court is
almost automatic."'
49
At no time has the fact that the Act is hair-triggered been more evi-
dent than in the commencement of an investigation of President Clinton's
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Henry Cisneros. 50 In
March of 1995, David M. Barrett was appointed as independent counsel in
charge of investigating Cisneros for failing to disclose payments to his
former mistress.15 1 At the time of the appointment, the Clinton White
House argued that this "was like calling in a SWAT team to investigate a
traffic violation.' 52 Attorney General Janet Reno responded by claiming
145. Zuckerman, supra note 123, at 80.
146. See Jost, supra note 2, at 149.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 59(a).
148. See Jost, supra note 2, at 149.
149. See id (quoting Joseph E. DiGenova, the original independent counsel in the Clinton
passport case).
150. See Anthony Lewis, ReductioAdAbsurdum, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23.
151. See id.
152. See Borger, supra note 144, at 33.
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that she was just following the law.1 53 Reno's response demonstrates the
need for Congress to revise the law to make it easier for the Attorney Gen-
eral to reject calls for an independent counsel in situations where the pub-
lic good is heavily outweighed by the expense.
C. Compensation Provisions
The most apparent flaw in the independent counsel statute is its com-
pensation provisions, or more properly stated, its lack of effective compen-
sation provisions. Although it sufficiently combats the institutional con-
flict of interest, the independent counsel compensation provisions create
new opportunities for conflicting interests, as evidenced by the sources and
size of Kenneth Starr's income. 54 Specifically, the law provides no check
against influence peddling. An independent counsel is free to accept funds
from any source outside the government.1 55 Therefore, it is easy to imag-
ine how an option of financial stability for the independent counsel could
lead to conflicting interests as significant as those the law was designed to
eliminate. For example, Kenneth Starr receives ten times his government
salary from corporations, some of which have a financial stake in the out-
come of the investigation. 56 The most honest person might feel a certain
amount of pressure to assist these companies. Accordingly, Congress
should revise the independent counsel compensation provisions to prevent
sources outside the federal government from contributing to the income of
an independent counsel. In conjunction with the other proposed limits,
which would mean fewer independent counsels, the federal government
should be able to pay enough to attract competent attorneys.
IV. Conclusion
Because of partisan politics, the independent counsel statute will
likely be difficult to revise. Since a majority in the House and Senate is
needed to revise the law, the political party that controls Congress is the
political party that controls reformation. Additionally, because Congress
initiates independent counsel investigations, the political party that con-
trols Congress is historically the party that benefits from the law. For in-
stance, the current Republican Congress will not want to revise the law be-
cause they have successfully used it to weaken President Clinton's
Administration. In fact, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Rep-
resentative Henry Hyde, recently suggested that the law should not be re-
153. See id.
154. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 594(b).
156. See Pincus & Lardner, supra note 19, at 11.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:255
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW
formed, reasoning that it is not a "good idea to change the ground rules at a
time when there is an independent counsel frenzy going on ..... Accusa-
tions could be made that we're trying to pull the rug from under the inde-
pendent counsels while they're working." 157
Inaction, on the other hand, cannot be blamed entirely on the Republi-
can Congress. Immediately following the Iran-Contra scandal, Republi-
cans became increasingly irritated with independent counsel Lawrence
Walsh. 158 In response to this frustration, Republicans publicly objected to
reauthorizing the independent counsel law.159 Democrats, however, were
not willing to give up this political weapon as they were experiencing a
rise in popularity due to the investigations of executive Republicans.
160
Accordingly, the country may have to wait until the same political party
controls both the executive and legislative branches of government before
real changes are implemented.
In any event, there is still a serious need for an impartial prosecutor as
a safeguard against the misuse of state power. The Act must be revised to
allow for an independent counsel in only the most extreme cases. Cur-
rently, the Act's broad scope and easy initiation procedures allow for its
use in even trivial cases. Further, the Act's compensation provisions fail to
remedy the problem of perceived and actual bias. Unless revised, the in-
dependent counsel law will likely continue to weaken the executive branch
and lower public confidence in the integrity of executive officials, not to
mention scaring off the most qualified individuals for executive positions.
To alleviate these problems, Congress should make it more difficult to ini-
tiate an investigation by giving the Attorney General more discretion. In
addition, once an investigation has been initiated, Congress should limit its
scope such that the law is only applicable to the President, Vice President,
and key White House and Justice Department officials. Congress should
also ensure that the independent counsel is limited to misuses of state
power that occur while executive officials are in office, and that all charges
are related to initial allegations or related misconduct. Further, unless ap-
propriate charges are brought within one year from the date that an investi-
gation is initiated, or good cause for an extension is asserted, Congress
should require that the investigation be terminated. Lastly, to minimize
perceived and real conflicts of interest, Congress should limit an independ-
ent counsel's compensation to his or her federal salary. If all of these steps
157. Editorial, GOP Heads Independent Counsel, THE FLA. TIMES UNION, Sept. 23, 1997, a
A4.
158. See Terry Eastland, Democrats Change Their Minds on Independent, Counsel Law
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1997, at A15.
159. See id.
160. See id.
Winter 1998]
276 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:255
are taken, a revised independent counsel system will safeguard against
overreaching executive power and restore public confidence in the integ-
rity of executive officials.
